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Development of digital main control rooms (MCRs) has greatly changed operating environments by
altering operator tasks, and thus the unique characteristics of digital MCRs should be considered in terms
of human reliability analysis. Digital MCR tasks can be divided into primary tasks that directly supply
control input to the plant equipment, and secondary tasks that include interface management conducted
via soft controls (SCs). Operator performance regarding these secondary tasks must be evaluated since
such tasks did not exist in previous analog systems. In this paper, we analyzed SC-related tasks based on
simulation data, and classiﬁed the error modes of the SCs following analysis of all operational tasks.
Then, we deﬁned the factors to be considered in human reliability analysis methods regarding the SCs;
such factors are mainly related to interface management and computerized operator support systems. As
these support systems function to reduce the number of secondary tasks required for SC, we conducted
an assessment to evaluate the efﬁciency of one such support system. The results of this study may
facilitate the development of training programs as well as help to optimize interface design to better
reﬂect the interface management task characteristics of digitalized MCRs.
© 2019 Korean Nuclear Society, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC. This is an open access article under the
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
With the technical development of the nuclear industry, nuclear
power plants (NPPs) have signiﬁcantly changed, and especially the
instrumentation and control systems. Some recently constructed
NPPs are equipped with completely digitalized instrumentation
and control systems and digital main control rooms (MCRs).
Fundamental variables of plant status are shown on the large
display panel (LDP), as well as the information ﬂat panel display
(IFPD) that each operator in theMCR has. Operators canmanipulate
the components using either a mouse or a touch panel called the
engineered safety featuresecomponent control system soft control
module (ESCM). These soft controls (SCs) are one of the biggest
changes affecting operation. Operators manipulate SCs in the
sitting position instead of going to an analog control board and
pressing buttons or conﬁrming alarms. Further, operational and
accident procedures have been computerized, so that operators
check their screens to conﬁrm the manuals and proper procedure
steps [1e3].by Elsevier Korea LLC. This is an
alysis of interface managem
9.04.010While these newly adopted designs are intended to reduce
performance time and improve human performance, evidence to
support such goals is insufﬁcient. Moreover, some negative effects
have recently been pointed out such as secondary tasks, which refer
to additional tasks required to perform the primary tasks that
include supervisory cognitions or controls of the plant [10]. Ex-
amples of secondary tasks include screen navigations to the target
screen or clicking the mouse for system alarm conﬁrmation. Such
tasks need to be analyzed, because they may increase the workload
of operators or potentially negatively affect the primary task.
In this paper, we focus on interface management tasks as one
aspect of SC secondary tasks. Analysis is based on data obtained
from an Advanced Power Reactor 1400 (APR-1400) simulator. The
data include operator control logs from a computerized procedure
system (CPS) and a manemachine interface (MMI) system and are
classiﬁed into primary and secondary tasks. Following a statistical
analysis of the data, results are used to discuss the effects of applied
interface management design.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 charac-
terizes SCs and interface management tasks, as well as the new
human error modes involved in digital MCRs. Section 3 deﬁnes the
speciﬁc issues related to the effects and drawbacks of interface
management. These issues are compared to the results of aopen access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
ent tasks in a digital main control room, Nuclear Engineering and
J. Choi et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Technology xxx (xxxx) xxx2statistical analysis based on simulation data in Section 4, and Sec-
tion 5 provides discussion and conclusions.2. Soft controls
2.1. New tasks in the digital MCR
Conventional MCR operator tasks are quite different from those
in digital MCRs. For example, in an emergency situation, the shift
supervisor (SS) in a conventional MCR instructs the board operators
to perform particular tasks to conﬁrm and control speciﬁc plant
variables according to paper-based procedures. The board opera-
tors, including the reactor operator (RO), turbine operator (TO), and
electric operator (EO), stand near the board. Following instruction
from the SS, they acquire information or control the NPP compo-
nents using analog devices. Operators in conventional MCRs must
determine the appropriate board for executing a task and move to
that board.
In a digital MCR on the other hand, there are seats for each
operator with individual IFPDs, ESCMs, and mouses available
(Fig. 1). The IFPDs consist of four separate screens that display the
shared CPS, MMI, and alarms, and operators can freely change the
contents of the screens. The SS instructs the operators to perform
tasks following a given procedure, which operators follow using the
shared procedure that can be individually conﬁrmed. Considering
such examples, the transition from conventional to digital MCRs
can be most clearly expressed as the updates in the manemachine
interfacesdwith the introduction of MCR digitalization, operator
tasks involving MMIs have totally changed.
Here, digital MCR tasks refer to the related cognitive, commu-
nicative, and operational activities, which can all be divided into
primary tasks that directly control plant equipment and additional
secondary tasks (Fig. 2). All tasks have changed signiﬁcantly from
conventional MCR tasks, and may vary due to the inﬂuence of
environmental factors. For example, considering cognitive tasks,
the various devices that indicate the state of the plant should be
considered. As the conventional analog indicators and alarms are
displayed as computer-based systems in digital MCRs, information
is communicated to operators in different ways. Communicative
tasks also differ in terms of the communication method and con-
tent in different operating environments, and these differences
should be considered when analyzing each task. Among these
tasks, the most signiﬁcant change is to the operational activities,
where generic primary tasks are conducted by mouse clicks or
observing the display, and awholly new set of secondary tasks have
emerged [5].Fig. 1. Digital MCR [4].
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The MMI, also called the humanesystem interface, is the main
ﬁeld where the interactions between humans and plant systems
occur. Operators should handle digitalized devices tomonitor or get
information, and detect the process parameters from the systems in
digitalized MCRs. Plant systems provide information to operators
through video display units, which are implemented in NPPs in the
form of IFPDs. These displays are the size of universal monitors, as
seen in Fig. 1, with the mouse and ESCMs used as input devices. As
the display is not large enough to show all the process parameters
of the plant simultaneously, considerations were undertaken about
how to properly display the parameters in the limited space. The
operator actions dealing with such MMIs are called interface
management tasks [9]. Interface management is part of operators’
generic secondary tasks, as shown in Fig. 3.
Absent in conventional facilities, interface management pre-
sents some issues for the digital environment. In NUREG-6690,
examples of interface management tasks such as conﬁguring,
navigating, arranging, interrogating, and automating were pre-
sented [11]. Here, conﬁguring refers to the activities required to set
up the MMIs of a computer workstation in a desired arrangement.
Navigating refers to the searching and accessing of speciﬁc aspects
of the MMIs. Arranging tasks adjust the information in the opera-
tor’s view, and interrogating tasks involve questioning the MMI to
determine plant status. Automating refers to setting up shortcuts to
make interface management easier. Among them, the conﬁguring,
arranging, and automating tasks are classiﬁed as pre-performed
tasks that the interface designers set up during the design pro-
cess of the system. This paper considers one example of an auto-
mating task, meant to reduce the secondary tasks load, called the
direct link button. This connects the CPS screen to the requiredMMI
screens, so that operators can change the screen with minimal
effort. Fig. 4 shows an example display image of the CPS in a digital
MCR containing a direct link button. In this ﬁgure, the operator can
access the containment spray (CS) screen on one display with one
click of the button; this operation has the effect of displaying the
system screen next to the CPS screen immediately. In typical op-
erations without a screen link button, the operator changes the
screen via the hierarchy system as in Figs. 5 and 6, where the
operator must determine the correct path to the target component
and execute the screen changes by clicking the system buttons [3].
Including the given example, various other kinds of operator sup-
port systems have been proposed and developed to reduce the
possibility of human error and increase the probability of recovery
from errors [7,16]. Otherwise, operators should perform navigating
tasks to reach the desired screen. Demonstrating their importance,
interface management tasks have been raised as a new human
factor issue in digital MCRs, as shown in Table 1 [8].
2.3. Human error modes at soft control
In Fig. 7, the possible error modes in SC operation are depicted.
The ﬁrst error is called Operation omission, where the operator se-
lects the proper operation according to the procedure but fails to
implement it. Alternatively, the operator may select the correct
screen and controller, but mistakenly perform a different operation
while omitting the correct one. The second error, Wrong object,
occurs when the operator selects and operates the wrong
controller, for example, by selecting a different screen or a similar
controller located near the intended controller on the correct
screen. The third error is Wrong operation and refers to when the
operator selects the correct screen and target controller but exe-
cutes it incorrectly. For example, the aim may be to close a valve,
but the “OPEN” button is pressed instead of the “CLOSE” button. Theent tasks in a digital main control room, Nuclear Engineering and
Fig. 2. Generic tasks in digital MCRs [5].
Fig. 3. Task of digital MCRs [9].
J. Choi et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Technology xxx (xxxx) xxx 3fourth error is calledMode confusion, which refers to the case when
an incorrect operation may be performed in a control window
having several control modes, by implementing operations without
modifying the operation mode appropriately. For example, pres-
sure may not be changed by manual operation if the control mode
remains in “AUTO”, which is operated automatically by the system,
and the operator does not click “MAN” to enable manual operation.Please cite this article as: J. Choi et al., Analysis of interface managem
Technology, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.net.2019.04.010The ﬁfth error, Inadequate operation, refers to the case when an
operation is not performed sufﬁciently. Such errors can occur when
completion of the operation (with the correct controller) is not
conﬁrmed. The last error is Delayed operation, where delays accu-
mulate caused by incorrect selection of the screen or controller, its
restoration process, or interface operation, resulting in a delay in
the overall operation [4].3. Issues concerning interface management tasks
As described in the previous section, new types of human error
modes or negative effects have emerged along with the adoption of
digital MCRs and their related interface management tasks. In the
assessment of human error, the operator support systems in these
digital MCRs should be considered. To identify the characteristics of
interface management tasks and demonstrate the practicality of
applied operator support systems, speciﬁcally the direct link button
in this paper, we present the following issues. These can be veriﬁed
based on simulation training data subject to current operators.
The questions to be addressed are listed below.
(1) Howmany total secondary tasks are performed in the SCs for
operational activity? How frequently are secondary tasks
performed compared with primary tasks? These questions
can clarify howmany additional tasks are loaded to operators
following the change of environment.
(2) Which secondary tasks are performed most often in simu-
lations? This question can derive what kinds of secondary
tasks give higher numbers of tasks to operators.ent tasks in a digital main control room, Nuclear Engineering and
Fig. 4. CPS display [6]. Yellow circles show the containment spray components and direct link button.
Fig. 5. Initial display frame of the operator workstation [3].
Fig. 6. First level of the IPS (reactor coolant system display page) [3].
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primary task? This question can evaluate the criticality of the
secondary tasks.
(4) How many screen changes are executed compared with the
minimum number of changes required? This question can
show operator efﬁciency in terms of screen changes.
(5) How often are screen link buttons used during an operation?
Do screen link buttons reduce the number of screen
changes? These questions can be a factor in determining the
eligibility of designs.
To examine the above issues, the number of tasks and screen
link button executions were counted from simulation data. These
were analyzed quantitatively and statistically, with results
compared to the above issues in the Discussion section.4. Simulation analysis
Simulations were executed in a simulation room mirroring the
digital MCR of the APR-1400. To extract secondary task data from
the SC-based operations, four camcorders recorded the displays as
well as the actions of the SS and the three operators (RO, TO, and
EO). All of their actions, including what they see through the dis-
plays and what they click using the mouse, are contained in the
data ﬁles. In this analysis, data from the RO and TO are used because
they have numerous operational activities in the performance of
the procedure. Two emergency scenario simulationsd steam
generator tube rupture (SGTR) and station black out (SBO)dwere
conducted. The number of accident simulations for SGTR and SBO
are 14 and 6, respectively, each conducted by separate operation
teams, for which data is contained in a video ﬁle of each complete
simulation from initiation to completion.
For quantitative analysis of the data, tasks were ﬁrst classiﬁed
into individual activities, as listed in Table 2. All activities during
operation were then grouped into three different categories: nav-
igation, manipulation, or acknowledgement. Here, navigation and
acknowledgement tasks are secondary tasks, which are performed
in order to support the primary tasks (manipulation). Based on the
classiﬁcation in Table 2, the number of total activities conducted
was counted.
To evaluate operator proﬁciency and the usability of the screen
link button, we propose two new ratios: screen navigation and
screen link button usage. These two factors are calculated as fol-
lows. The ‘smallest number of screen navigations by design’ meansent tasks in a digital main control room, Nuclear Engineering and
Table 1
Human factor issues in digital MCRs [8].
Design element Human factor issue Description
Information display based on computer Information overload  Overlapping windows
 Too much information
 Faster information than visual process of human
Interface management tasks  Navigation task before the primary task
 Losing the information because of secondary task
Computerized procedure Team performance  Communication dis-connection between operators
Situation awareness  The depending on the computerized procedure
Level of automation  Automation level
Keyhole effect  The limitation of parallel process
CPS failure in complex situation  The conversion problem of the paper procedures
Soft controller Unintentional activation Unintended activity
Description errors Slip by ambiguous information
Mode errors Mode error
Disordering the components of an action sequence Skip by the continuous task, repetition, reverse procedure
Capture error Confusion with the task frequency




































Fig. 7. Error modes of SC operation [4].
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maximum screen link buttons available. The minimum number of
screen navigations for a given situation was derived byTable 2
Detailed classiﬁcation of operational tasks [15].
Classiﬁcation ACTIVITY NAME Contents
Navigation (Secondary Tasks) SWITCH_SCR Activity that change the screen t
OPEN_CTRPNL Activity that open pop-up operat
CLOSE_CTRLPNL Activity to close the operation w
Manipulation (Primary Tasks) CLICK_EXECUTE Activity to manipulate a particul
CLICK_REGU_UPDN Activity to press up and down ar
CLICK_ENABLED Activity to press the “enable” bu
CLICK_MANUAL Activity to press the “manual” bu
Acknowledgement (Secondary
Tasks)
CONF_STEP Activity conﬁrming the completi
CONF_SUBSTEP Activity conﬁrming the completi
ACK_ALARM Activity to check and clear alarm
CONF_CHANN Activity to press the “channel ch
particular system
Please cite this article as: J. Choi et al., Analysis of interface managem
Technology, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.net.2019.04.010demonstrating the scenarios.
Screen navigation ratio
¼ Number of screen navigations used by the operator
Smallest number of screen navigations by design
(1)
Screen linkbuttonusage ratio
¼ Numberof screen linkbuttonusagesby theoperator
Maximumnumberof screen linkbuttonusages available
(2)
4.1. Secondary tasks analysis results
The numbers of primary and secondary tasks for the two acci-
dent simulations were counted as shown Fig. 8. It can be seen that
the number of secondary tasks exceeds that of primary tasks;
particularly, in the case of “SGTR_RO” and “SBO_RO”, four times
more secondary tasks were performed than primary tasks. We also
conﬁrmed here that no primary task failure was caused by sec-
ondary task failure. Information acquisition tasks were excluded
from this analysis because they cannot be directly observed in the
video data. Additionally, the “ACK_ALRM” activity to clear the alarm
was also excluded as it does not affect actual operation.
The total numbers of secondary tasks are listed in Fig. 9 by type.
They differ depending on the particular operator and the scenario.o identify or manipulate the system state
ion windows on the IFPD or ESCM for operation of a particular system
indow on the IFPD or ESCM for the operation of a particular system
ar system
row buttons during operation to adjust a particular system
tton on an interface for operation of a particular system
tton on an interface for operation of a particular system
on of a step in the procedure
on of each instruction in the step of a procedure
s
eck” button on an interface for channel identiﬁcation before operation of a
ent tasks in a digital main control room, Nuclear Engineering and
Fig. 8. Total numbers of primary and secondary tasks performed by the RO and TO for
(a) SGTR and (b) SBO events.
Fig. 9. Total number of activities corresponding to each secondary task for SGTR and
SBO events.
J. Choi et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Technology xxx (xxxx) xxx6The “SWTICH_SCR” activity had the highest total number among
the activities, and “CLOSE_CTRLPNL” had the lowest. Notably,
“CLOSE_CTRLPNL” had quite a lower number in comparison with
“OPEN_CTRLPNL”.4.2. Screen navigation analysis results
We analyzed the number of operator screen changes and the
usability of the screen link button. The two proposed factors, screenFig. 10. Screen navigation ratios and screen link button usage ratios
Please cite this article as: J. Choi et al., Analysis of interface managem
Technology, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.net.2019.04.010navigation ratio and screen link button usage ratio, were calculated
using Eqs. (1) and (2) with collected data. The screen navigation
ratio is the percentage of screen navigations used by operators from
the minimum number of screen navigations as designed. It in-
dicates how well the operator ﬁnds the correct path in the MMI
system. The mean value of this ratio was 2.115 (median ¼ 2.000,
SD ¼ 1.282), indicating that the operators made almost twice as
many screen changes as necessary to reach the desired screen for
the primary task. In the case of the screen link button usage ratio,
27 cases of screen link button usages were observed out of 108
possible opportunities, giving a derived ratio of 0.250 (25%).
To determine whether using the screen link button decreases
the total number of screen changes, we speciﬁed two groups: one
using the screen link button and one without it. We performed a t-
test to verify the statistical difference of the screen navigation ratios
between the two groups. The group that used the screen link but-
ton had a mean value of 1.000, while the other group (without the
screen link button) had a value of 2.411. Such a difference between
the two groups is signiﬁcant (t ¼ 12.35, df ¼ 80, p-value < 2.2e-16).
To visualize the effect of screen link button usage, graphs
comparing the two ratios are plotted in Fig. 10. Normalized lines
show the trends among the simulation data points. Overall, it can
be said that the screen navigation ratio decreases as the screen link
button usage ratio increases, as the total number of secondary task
screen changes implemented by the operator during screen navi-
gation (i.e. “SWITCH_SCR”) is reduced by the proper use of the
screen link button in the CPS. As indicated by all coefﬁcients of
determination being over 0.65, the total number of screen navi-
gations performed by operators who used the screen link button
tend to be fewer than those by other operators.5. Discussion
With the analyzed simulation data, all raised issues in Section 3
can be checked. The number of counted secondary tasks greatly
exceeds that of the primary tasks in every case, with over four times
more in the maximum case “SBO_RO” (issue 1). This shows that
these additional tasks are a matter to be recognized in order to
evaluate human reliability in digitalized MCRs. Among the sec-
ondary tasks, “SWTICH_SCR” had the highest frequency of execu-
tion (issue 2); therefore, it can be assumed that this task takes the
largest portion of secondary task operation. Despite the high fre-
quency of secondary tasks though, there was no failure of primaryfor the RO and TO in (aeb) SGTR and (ced) SBO, respectively.
ent tasks in a digital main control room, Nuclear Engineering and
J. Choi et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Technology xxx (xxxx) xxx 7tasks caused by secondary tasks (issue 3). This is because failure of
secondary tasks does not directly affect primary operation activ-
ities, and further, it is hard to observe secondary task failures since
they can be easily recovered by information from the MMIs. From
another point of view, such primary failure may not have been
observed here due to the small number of simulations.
In the results of the screen link button analysis, the derived ratio
indicated that operators perform two times more secondary tasks
than the designed number (issue 4). This means that there is room
to improve the working environment of operators to reduce this
number of performed secondary tasks. Finally, we found that usage
of screen link buttons reduced the number of screen changes
compared to the two proposed ratios (issue 5). However, this
designed support function had a low frequency of use at only 22.1%
in the simulation; this can be interpreted to mean that improve-
ments in the usability of the support system will decrease the
number of performed secondary tasks.
6. Conclusion
Operation environments of digitalizedMCRs differ from those of
conventional MCRs. As such, the human reliability factors associ-
ated with operators are signiﬁcantly affected by these different
operating environments, and it is necessary to carefully evaluate
this inﬂuence [14]. Digitalized MCRs, with a variety of designs,
possess new features such as computerized procedures and oper-
ator support systems, and digitalized alarm systems. Among them,
the use of soft controls has the biggest inﬂuence on operator error.
In this paper, the issues to be considered in human reliability
analyses of SC operation have been deﬁned. For this purpose, the
characteristics of interface management tasks were described,
followed by SC task and accident simulation data analyses.
First, the results of this study show how properly the interface
management tasks are performed in digital MCRs by counting
number of interface management tasks performed during plant
operation and comparing to the number of primary tasks. Failure of
primary tasks caused by failure of secondary tasks was not
observed, even though the number of secondary tasks is larger. The
high frequency of secondary tasks can increase the complexity of
tasks for operators; therefore, countermeasures should be prepared
to reduce task loads from the secondary tasks. Possibilities for such
measures may include education for operators or improvements to
MMI setups. As a result of data analysis, the “OPEN_CTRPL” and
“SWITCH_SCR” activities were found to be performed at the highest
frequencies; such quantitative results may be combined with pre-
vious qualitative results, such as Kim et al. (2014) where operator
task loads according to the activities were derived [12]. Second,
through analyzing the two proposed ratios, we conﬁrmed that
operators tended to make more screen changes than the designed
number, with the support system (screen link button) not properly
utilized. Thus, education on proper navigation techniques is
needed, along with further analysis on screen navigation charac-
teristics. For human reliability analyses of operators in digital MCRs,
future studies should reﬂect the present ﬁndings alongwith related
studies such as Park et al. (2016) that showed that screen change
patterns are related to operators’ careers through process mining
[13].
The limitations of this study are as follows. First, only twoPlease cite this article as: J. Choi et al., Analysis of interface managem
Technology, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.net.2019.04.010accident scenarios were considered for the analysis; more scenarios
should be considered to observe more diverse patterns of interface
management tasks. Second, the operational environment of the
simulations differed from a real accident situation regarding
operator workload, stress, and decision burden. Third, although the
scenarios provided to all operating teams were the same across
each accident simulation, the procedure steps and operations per-
formed differed, depending on the knowledge of each team and
their selected strategy. Fourth, the effectiveness of the secondary
tasks was not considered in this study, despite urgent or otherwise
high-pressure conditions greatly inﬂuencing task performance. In
future work, we will conduct a timeline study for analyzing per-
formance times and frequencies to show the criticality of secondary
tasks in an accident situation.
Acknowledgement
This work was supported by the National Research Foundation
of Korea (NRF) grant funded by the Korean government (MSIP:
Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning) (No.
2018M2B2B1065653).
References
[1] Emilie M. Roth, Randall J. Mumaw, William F. Stubler, Human factors evalu-
ation issues for advanced control rooms: a research agenda, in: Human Fac-
tors and Power Plants, 1992., Conference Record for 1992 IEEE Fifth
Conference on, IEEE, 1992.
[2] D.Y. Kim, J. Kim, How does a change in the control room design affect diag-
nostic strategies in nuclear power plants? J. Nucl. Sci. Technol. 51 (10) (2014)
1288e1310.
[3] M.S. Lee, et al., Development of human factors validation system for the
advanced control room of APR1400, J. Nucl. Sci. Technol. 46 (1) (2009)
90e101.
[4] S.J. Lee, J. Kim, S.C. Jang, Human error mode identiﬁcation for NPP main
control room operations using soft controls, J. Nucl. Sci. Technol. 48 (6) (2011)
902e910.
[5] Ying-Lien Lee, Sheue-Ling Hwang, Eric Min-Yang Wang, Reducing cognitive
workload of a computer-based procedure system, Int. J. Hum. Comput. Stud.
63 (6) (2005) 587e606.
[6] N. Seong, S. Lee, A Study on Requirements of Data Base Translator for APR1400
Computerized Procedure System at Shin-Hanul Unit 1 and 2, Transactions of
the Korean Nuclear Society Spring Meeting Jeju, Korea, 2015.
[7] S.J. Lee, P.H. Seong, Development of an integrated decision support system to
aid cognitive process of operators, Nuclear Eng. Tech. 39 (6) (2007) 703e717.
[8] J. Kim, et al., “HuRECA: the Human Reliability Analysis Method for Computer-
Based Advanced Control Rooms,” KAERI/TR-4385/2011, 2011.
[9] S.J. Lee, W. Jung, H. Kim, “Analysis of Interface Management Tasks in Advanced
Main Control Rooms Based on Simulator Data”, TR-5193/2013, Korea Atomic
Energy Research Institute, 2013.
[10] Stubler, J.M. O’Hara, “Soft Control: Technical Basis and Human Factors Review
Guidance”, BNL-NUREG-52565, NUREG/CR-6635, 2000.
[11] O’Hara, William S. Brown, “The Effects of Interface Management Tasks on
Crew Performance and Safety in Complex”, Computer-Based Systems, BNL-
NUREG-52656, NUREG/CR-6690, 2002.
[12] Y. Kim, W. Jung, S. Kim, Empirical investigation of workloads of operators in
advanced control rooms, J. Nucl. Sci. Technol. 51 (6) (2014) 744e751.
[13] J. Park, J.Y. Jung, W. Jung, The use of a process mining technique to charac-
terize the work process of main control room crews: a feasibility study, Reliab.
Eng. Syst. Saf. 154 (2016) 31e41.
[14] S.J. Lee, J. Kim, W. Jung, Quantitative estimation of the human error proba-
bility during soft control operations, Ann. Nucl. Energy 57 (2013) 318e326.
[15] S. Kim, Y. Kim, W. Jung, “The Development of an Framework to Measure
Workload of MCR Operators in Nuclear Power Plants”, KAERI/TR-4741/2012,
2012.
[16] S.J. Lee, P.H. Seong, Experimental investigation into the effects of decision
support systems on operator performance, J. Nucl. Sci. Technol. 46 (12) (2009)
1178e1187.ent tasks in a digital main control room, Nuclear Engineering and
